In this paper, we analyze corporate bonds with a rating-triggered stepup provision in a continuous-time framework with bankruptcy costs and tax benefits. While without any further frictions, step-up bonds do not add firm value relative to straight debt, agency conflicts and asymmetric information are two possible explanations for the issuance of these instruments. We treat both motives (separately) in a unified framework to obtain conclusions about both the optimal design and the conditions for the use of step-up bonds. The closed-form solutions for the optimal contract design reveal that step-up bonds issued by firms that face a risk-shifting problem fundamentally differ from those in the case of asymmetric information. Furthermore, we show that firms with a high initial risk only use step-up bonds to overcome problems of asymmetric information but not to mitigate risk-shifting problems. A further difference between the two motives is that in the case of risk-shifting, step-up bonds are only used when the agency conflict is sufficiently severe, while for signalling reasons even a modest problem of asymmetric information supports the use of step-up bonds.
Introduction
Corporate bonds might be issued with several different provisions giving the bondholders some additional contractual rights. One of these rights is a so-called stepup provision, which states that the initial coupon rate paid to the holders of the bond will be increased once some predefined event takes place. Most frequently this event is linked to the rating of the issuing firm. If the rating is downgraded to some contractually laid down level, the coupon rate will be increased by a certain fraction. A sizeable volume of such rating-trigger step-up bonds have been issued in particular by firms from the telecom industry (see table 1 for a representative example). From an investors' perspective, such a provision might be considered as nice to have, since it promises a higher payment at a time when the credit risk of the firm increases and thus the bond price would suffer otherwise. However, from the perspective of the issuing firm, it is much less clear for why it might be a good idea to write such a contract because firms have to pay out more to its debt holders when less cash is available.
Empirical evidence for the consequences from a step-up feature is given by e 500,000,000 6.5% * Oct. 07, 2009 XS0155312829 GBP 500,000,000 7.125% * Sep. 26, 2012 XS0158739739 GBP 250,000,000 7.375% * Dec. 04, 2019 * In the event of ratings change by Moody's and S&P that causes the ratings to be below of Baa1 by Moody's and BBB+ by S&P the interest rates on the notes will increase by 0.5% with effect from the first interest payment date after this rating change occurs. (Reversible) Houweling et al. (2004) and Lando and Mortensen (2004) . The latter calibrate a reduced-form model and compare step-up bonds to otherwise similar straight fixed-coupon bonds. They find that step-up bonds increase the cost of capital for the issuer so that step-up features should be avoided. The observation that firms still use step-up bonds seems to be even more puzzling, when we analyze this aspect in a typical tradeoff model for the optimal capital structure in a world with tax benefits and bankruptcy costs (see e.g. Fischer et al. (1989) and Leland (1994) ). Within this modelling approach, the optimal debt volume, that maximizes the firm value, is positively related to the underlying state variable (e.g. asset value or firm's instantaneous cash flow). Hence, if the state variable deteriorates and the firm value declines, an increase of the debt obligation cannot be optimal in order to add firm value.
1
As it is frequently the case in financial economics, two notorious distortions of the perfect markets assumption are considered to explain this apparent puzzle: Agency conflicts and asymmetric information. Thus, we have (at least) two intuitive candidate motives for the use of step-up provisions. The reasoning behind the first distortion is that the step-up feature might be able to mitigate the risk-shifting (asset substitution) incentive of manager-owners because a higher risk increases the likelihood of a rating-trigger. Regarding the second distortion, the step-up provision might also be considered as a credible device to signal some non-observable pricing-relevant firm characteristics to potential investors because primarily risky firms might not want to have a (costly) step-up feature. Our paper is not the first to come up with these explanations for the use of stepup bonds. Bhanot and Mello (2006) address the asset substitution problem, while Manso et al. (2007) analyze the signalling hypothesis within the broader class of performance-sensitive debt contracts. The broad conclusion emerging from existing literature is that step-up bonds cannot solve the risk-shifting problem, 2 but are able to credibly signal non-observable firm characteristics.
3
However, there are still a number of open issues and shortcomings, that leave unsettled the question if step-up bonds can be an optimal financing instrument. First, Bhanot and Mello (2006) do not address a general optimization problem. On the one hand, they do not consider the optimal step-up bond design as the result of maximizing ex ante firm value with respect to all verifiable character-1 Recent work by Strebulaev (2007) finds empirical evidence that data are more consistent with comparative static predictions from trade-off theory than is traditionally thought. 2 "In general, an increase in the coupon level decreases firm value and does not inhibit (and might even stimulate) asset substitution." Bhanot and Mello (2006) , Remark 6, p. 91. 3 See Manso et al. (2007) , Proposition 1, p. 21.
istics of such a contract. 4 On the other hand, they only allow for a restricted risk-shifting strategy. 5 Second, in the signaling game of Manso et al. (2007) , firms can choose between issuing performance-sensitive debt or equity. They find that performance-sensitive debt can establish a separating equilibrium in cases where this is not possible with a straight bond. 6 However, when debt is a crucial financing instrument for firms (in order to benefit from tax benefits or to prevent the loss of control rights to new investors), a signaling game, where the signal is given by the specific bond design and not by the choice between debt and equity should be considered. Third, both contributions neither aim at characterizing the optimal step-up bond design, nor discuss conditions (with respect to the relevant parameters) under which the use of step-up bonds might be optimal. This however, are prerequisites to infer testable implications.
In this paper, we want to close the gap from the three concerns mentioned above. For this purpose, we treat both motives (separately) in a unified framework. Our goal is to characterize the optimal contract design as well as to derive testable implications about the use of step-up bonds. We find that in contrast to Bhanot and Mello (2006) , step-up bonds can mitigate the agency conflict if the more general optimization problem is solved. We are able to derive closed-form solutions for the optimal step-up bond design and can characterize the conditions under which the use of step-up bonds is optimal. With respect to asymmetric information, we show that similar to Manso et al. (2007) , a separating equilibrium can be established when a signal is derived from the specific bond design (i.e. the inclusion or exclusion of a step-up provision). We can describe the optimal contract design and provide results concerning the conditions for an equilibrium. Our major finding is that the equilibrium predictions from the two hypotheses contrast sharply regarding the optimal bond design and the optimal use of step-up bonds. In particular, the firm characteristics and an observed bond design can immediately explain whether a risk-shifting problem or a problem of asymmetric information is the main reason for why a firm uses step-up bonds: In terms of the optimal bond design, a bond with a finite step-up factor is is-sued given that the risk-shifting problem can be mitigated with step-up bonds. Conversely, for a problem of asymmetric information, a bond with a zero-coupon is issued to signal favorable information that starts paying a coupon (infinite step-up factor) once the rating event is triggered. Regarding the optimal use of step-up bonds, we obtain that firms with a high initial risk never use step-up bonds to mitigate risk-shifting problems, while for problems of asymmetric information step-up bonds can be an attractive device. In general, step-up bonds are primarily used when the risk-shifting problem is sufficiently severe, while for signalling reasons even a modest problem of asymmetric information supports the use of step-up bonds.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section puts up the general model framework and establishes that absent any frictions, step-up bonds are not optimal. In section 3, we introduce agency conflicts in the sense that manager-owners might follow a self-interested risk-shifting policy. Section 4 considers the alternative explanation that the use of step-up bonds is due to asymmetric information problems. Finally, in section 5, the different equilibrium predictions are discussed. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are contained in the appendix.
General Model Framework
We consider a firm that owns some productive assets generating a continuous cash-flow x, whose dynamics are given by
where, as usual, dZ t denotes the increment of a standard Wiener process and µ and σ are constant parameters. For pricing purposes, we assume perfect capital markets on which a risk-free asset with a constant instantaneous risk-free interest rate r is continuously traded. Either all market participants are risk-neutral or markets are arbitrage-free which implies that there exists a martingale measure which allows for risk-neutral pricing. In the latter case µ denotes the risk-adjusted drift term which is restricted to µ < r to guarantee finite security values. The present value of any arbitrary claim C(x) whose instantaneous payoff is an affine function a x + b on the state variable x, can then be written as the sum of the present value of the flow of payoffs to the claimholders from time t up to some (stopping) time T and the present value of the claim at that time :
To apply this general framework to the case of a firm that considers to issue debt with a rating-trigger step-up feature, note that such a contract will essentially consist of three elements:
(i) The initial coupon rate c before a rating-trigger,
(ii) the step-up factor δ > 1 (i.e. after a step-up event has occurred, the new coupon is δc), and (iii) the trigger threshold x T < x 0 , i.e. once the cash flow x hits the barrier x T , the step-up takes place. We consider the case of an irreversible step-up event. If subsequent to the step-up, x rises above x T again, the coupon rate remains at δc.
Thus, we can completely characterize the step-up bond contract by the triple (c, δ, x T ). The equity holders are residual claimants in the sense that they immediately receive the cash flow that exceeds the coupon obligations. If the cash flow is insufficient to cover the coupon payments, deep-pocketed equity holders have to make up for the difference. This standard payout policy means that we rule out that the firm finances the coupon payments by selling part of the assets and that the dividend is set strategically.
7 Furthermore, we assume that absolute priority of the debt claim is enforced so that renegotiations, which result in strategic debt service, cannot take place. 8 Since this rule implies that equity holders are left with nothing in the case of default, we obtain the following representation for the equity value, which we denote by S:
7 See e.g. Morellec (2001) for a model where assets can be sold to finance debt service or dividend payments. Strebulaev (2007) allows for asset sales if firms enter into financial distress. 8 See e.g. Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) , Mella-Barral (1999) , Fan and Sundaresan (2000) , Koziol (2006) or Hackbarth et al. (2007) for the implications of strategic debt service.
where 1 {·} denotes the indicator function and τ stands for the tax rate on corporate income. For notational convenience, we abstract from further taxes on the personal level. T b denotes the stopping time, i.e. the time of default of a levered firm, while T T denotes the time when the rating-trigger level is attained. To have a meaningful problem, we can focus on those step-up bonds that imply T T < T b , i.e. the step-up occurs before the firm defaults. It is apparent that a step-up bond design so that the coupon δc after a step-up will never be paid to debt holders but the firm defaults before, is not optimal to increase the value of a firm that uses a straight consol bond. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that for T T ≥ T b the coupon payments to debt holders are like those of a straight consol bond but the potential increase of the coupon obligation can result in an earlier costly default. With standard pricing techniques, we can write the equity value S in (2) as of time t 0 in the following way:
where x b and x T are the cash flow levels that determine the corresponding stopping times, i.e. T b = inf{s; x s = x b } and T T = inf{s; x s = x T }. The parameter β < 0 can be obtained from the (negative) root of the characteristic equation y(y − 1) + µy − r = 0 in y and amounts to
The variable β contains the characteristic parameters µ and σ that drive the cash flow process and the risk-free rate r.
The term
, that plays an important role for all security values, has the interpretation of a probability-weighted discount factor, 9 i.e. the present value of one unit of account that is paid out if and only if the process x t hits the boundary x (·) from above for the first time. Therefore 0 < x x (·) β ≤ 1 holds. Equation (3) shows that the equity value with the step-up feature equals the 9 This interpretation follows from the fact that E
. See also MellaBarral (1999), p. 541. equity value under plain debt (first line) for the given default barrier x b plus an additional term (1 − τ )
which accounts for the additional coupon payments once the step-up has taken place, i.e. the trigger level x T has been attained. Since x T ≥ x b , this component is always positive (for δ > 1) and thus reduces the equity value for a given default barrier x b . We note that the optimal default barrier x b depends on the coupon δc after a step-up. Analogous reasoning leads to the debt value. However, due to the absolute priority rule, we need to specify the value of debt in case of default. In line with most of the literature, 10 we assume that in case of default the debt value equals the value of an unlevered firm minus bankruptcy costs. The variable α denotes the bankruptcy costs as a fraction of the unlevered firm value (1 − τ )
at the default time. The default value L(x t ) at the cash flow level x t is then given by
We note that a default either means a restructuring of the firm or a liquidation. As long as both events are associated with bankruptcy costs, it is not crucial for us which type of a default is present.
Applying the general solution, we obtain the following representation for the present value of debt D:
In line with the equity value S, we can understand the debt value D as the sum of two components. The first two terms correspond to the value of a straight bond for a given default barrier x b . The last term
the present value of an increase of the coupon due to a rating-trigger. The value of the levered firm, which we denote by V is then the sum of (3) and (4):
In general, the initial owners of the firm face the problem to design the step-up bond so that the firm value is maximized in t 0 given the initial cash flow level x 0 . In our setup, this is done by choosing some optimal security design, i.e. by fixing the terms of the debt issue (c, δ, x T ). Note that these decision variables are contractible. Once the debt is issued, the firm acts in favor of the equity holders rather than the entire firm value. Thus, the default barrier x b , which cannot be part of a contract, is chosen by the firm so that the equity value is optimized. As a consequence, the optimization problem of the firm reads:
Since a default can only take place after the step-up event, i.e. when the firm has straight debt with a coupon δc outstanding, we can also apply the well-known representation 11 for the optimal default barrier in the case of straight debt by incorporating the coupon δc after a step-up:
This barrier is a result of the smooth-pasting condition of the equity value S in the cash flow x t . 12 The barrier x b is linear in the coupon δc and independent of the actual cash flow level x t . Now, we can plug in the solution for the default constraint in order to obtain the optimal design of the step-up bond that maximizes the firm value. We find that bonds with a step-up feature are not required for an optimal firm value. We state this as Proposition 1 It is not optimal for a firm to issue a rating-trigger step-up bond, as long as there are no agency conflicts regarding risk-shifting and no problems of asymmetric information.
It is easily verified that the derivative of V with respect to the trigger level x T is given by
which is apparently positive for any choice of c > 0 and δ > 1. Thus, a trigger barrier x T below the current cash flow level x 0 is not optimal.
The intuition for why the step-up feature always destroys firm value, given no problems regarding risk-shifting and asymmetric information are present, is that the step-up bond increases the coupon obligation at a time when the firm generates lower cash flows and thus rather wants to decrease its debt burden than to increase it. As a consequence, the existence of step-up bonds cannot be explained within this basic set-up and we need to incorporate additional model features. As mentioned above, agency conflicts and asymmetric information might be motives for the optimal use of a step-up bond.
3 Agency Conflicts
Optimal
Step-up Bond Design
In this section, we assume that the firm has the possibility to change the investment program. More precisely, in line with most of the literature on asset substitution, 13 we consider the case that the manager-owners of the firm have a unique, irreversible opportunity to alter the risk profile of the assets in place in the sense that the volatility of the cash flow process can be increased from σ to σ H , while all other parameters remain unaffected. In the case of straight debt, we know from the basic Leland (1994) model that a higher volatility σ H ceteris paribus results in a lower firm value. However, from the perspective of the equity holders only, an increase of the risk is desirable because σ H increases the equity value due to the option-like nature of their claim, or in more technical terms, due to the convexity in the state variable. This phenomenon is known as the risk incentive or asset substitution problem. Absent any possibility for debt holders to discipline or to put sanctions on the manager-owners, the latter will immediately increase the risk after the debt is issued. This risk-shift, however, will be anticipated by the debt holders and thus the firm is only able to place its debt issue at the unfavorable high risk terms. Obviously, the firm would be better off and could add firm value, if this agency conflict could be mitigated. In what follows, we explore the capability of step-up bonds to resolve this conflict.
We formalize the idea of a risk-shift by introducing another threshold x σ at
13 See e.g. Leland (1998) , Ericsson (2000) or Flor (2006) .
which the manager-owners change the cash flow process from the low to the high risk. Apparently, if a firm has a rating-trigger step-up bond outstanding, the barrier x σ at which the firm increases the risk must be above or equal to the rating-trigger barrier x T . This is a consequence of the fact that after a debt issuance the firm acts in favor of the equity holders. Since the firm effectively has a straight bond with coupon δc outstanding once the cash flow hits x T , the firm will definitely increase its risk at this barrier as long as it has not done so before. Therefore, we can restrict ourselves to the case x T ≤ x σ . With analogous notation, we can express the equity value as
where T σ = inf{s; x s = x σ } and the notation x σ H indicates that the higher diffusion parameter is involved. Evaluating the above expression and the corresponding expression for the debt value, we find
where β H indicates that the high risk σ H is involved. Note further that according to (6) the optimal default boundary depends on β. Since the risk-shift occurs before the default threshold is attained, x b in the above expressions is determined using β H rather than β.
14 Note that it is a priori not clear whether . On the one hand, due to the higher risk after a risk-shift, the threshold x H b will be attained faster. On the other hand, because the default threshold 14 In order to be precise, we should write this as x H b . However, to ease notation, we omit the superscript if no explicit reference is needed. is determined endogenously, x H b is lower than x b , so that the net effect is a priori undetermined.
To determine the optimal design of a step-up bond in the presence of a riskshifting possibility, the firm faces a similar optimization problem as in (5), i.e. the firm value is maximized with respect to the step-up bond features (c, δ, x T ). The difference is that not only the default barrier x b is set by the firm in order to maximize the equity value after debt issuance but also the risk-shifting barrier x σ , because a risk-shift is not contractible. The firm value follows from the sum of (7) and (8). These considerations result in the following optimization problem:
This formulation of the optimization problem differs in two important points from the model in Bhanot and Mello (2006) : First, we address the problem of optimal security design, in the way that the step-up design must be the outcome of maximizing the firm value with respect to the triple (c, δ, x T ). From our perspective, this is the reasonable notion, since these bond characteristics are contractible. In contrast, Bhanot and Mello (2006) proceed in the following way. They fix the amount of debt raised through a bond without a step-up provision, and examine the effect on the equity value if the same amount of debt is raised through a debt issue that includes a step-up feature. This approach, however, cannot solve the optimal security design problem in general.
15
Second, we allow for a risk-shift at an arbitrary point in time, i.e. we consider an endogenous risk-shifting policy by ex post equity holders. Since the risk-shifting policy is observable but not contractible (otherwise we would not have a meaningful agency conflict), it acts as a constraint to the optimization problem. In Bhanot and Mello (2006) the risk-shifting policy is exogenously restricted, and can only occur immediately after a bond issue.
To solve the optimization problem in (9), we already clarified the optimal solution of x b in the previous section, so it remains to be shown how the risk-shifting barrier is optimally set. To this end, it is helpful to rewrite the equity value in (7) as follows:
with: Q ≡ c r
Note that Q is independent of the risk-shifting strategy x σ . Thus, the maximization of the equity value S in x σ is equivalent to the maximization (minimization) of the factor
given that Q is negative (positive). One can easily show that
holds. Apparently, the earlier the firm increases the risk of the cash flow process (i.e. x σ is higher), the earlier a given barrier x T is hit. As a consequence, we can directly derive the optimal solution for x σ as
The optimal risk-shifting policy is to switch to the more risky investment either instantaneously or to wait until the trigger threshold is attained. The result has an intuitive interpretation. The term Q is the sum of the present value of the additional coupon payment in perpetuity minus the value of the option to default conditional on arriving at the level x T . If the absolute value of the option exceeds the value of the additional coupon payment then Q < 0 and it is optimal for equity holders to switch immediately to the high risk strategy. In that case the disadvantage from additional coupon payments is only moderate relative to the advantage given by the option to voluntarily default. On the other hand, if the value of the additional coupon payment exceeds the absolute option value, then Q > 0 and equity holders will find it optimal not to increase the risk until the trigger threshold x T has been hit. Note that Q itself depends on the terms of the step-up bond (c, δ, x T ). For notational convenience, we will call bonds for which a risk-shift is not optimal before x T , i.e. Q > 0, as bonds that satisfy the risk mitigation property.
We can always find a design of step-up bonds so that the risk mitigation property is satisfied, while also different designs exist for which the risk mitigation property does not hold. With a step-up factor δ close to one, the step-up property is not very pronounced and the firm has no incentive to prevent an increase of the risk to avoid additional coupon payments. Formula (6) for the optimal default barrier confirms that in this case Q is always negative. Conversely, if the step-up factor δ and the trigger barrier x T are sufficiently high, the step-up feature is very severe. Thus, it is plausible that the firm wants to prevent a step-up trigger which implies no voluntary risk-shift. In this case, Q is positive because the factor
β H tends to zero but the first term c r (δ − 1) is very large. We summarize these findings as Proposition 2 (Endogenous risk-shifting policy) If a firm has an arbitrary ratingtrigger step-up bond outstanding and manager-owners have a unique irreversible possibility to change the risk from σ to σ H > σ, they will either increase the risk promptly or wait until the cash flow process x hits the rating-trigger barrier x T . Other risk-shifting strategies x σ with x T < x σ < x 0 are never optimal.
If the asset substitution problem is to be solved by the issue of a step-up bond, proposition 2 tells us that the terms of the bond have to be set such that Q ≥ 0. At Q = 0, where the manager-owners are indifferent with respect to the timing of the risk-shift, we assume that they act in favor of the firm value so that x σ also equals x T . Figure 1 visualizes the part of the (δ, x T )-space (given some arbitrary coupon c) for which Q is positive or negative. The dashed line indicates all trigger barriers x T which are equal to the default threshold x b . Thus, this line excludes the region on the right side from this line because for those pairs (δ, x T ) the step-up feature is not relevant as the default barrier x b is above the trigger barrier x T . In the region below the convex solid curve, the risk mitigation property is not satisfied, i.e. the pairs (δ, x T ) imply Q < 0. In other words, for a given x T , the step-up factors δ are too low to provide a sufficient incentive for the firm to postpone a risk-shift. Accordingly, for a given δ, the x T in that region are too high to be incentive compatible. Consequently, the remaining shaded region contains all feasible, incentive compatible combinations of x T and δ, which might be candidates for the optimal design of the step-up bond. Appendix A shows that the optimal design of a step-up bond must consist of pairs (δ, x T ) from the boundary indicated by the bold section of the convex curve. An intuitive explanation for the fact that there is no interior solution in the shaded region is as follows: Since the step-up of the The diagram shows the combinations (δ, x T ), which satisfy the risk mitigation property, i.e. Q ≥ 0 holds, as the grey shaded area. The other combinations (δ, x T ) either violate the risk mitigation property (x T is below the convex function x T (δ) for those δ) or the trigger barrier x T would exceed the default barrier x b (x T is below the dashed line for those δ) which contradicts a reasonable step-up design. The other parameter values are: x 0 = 1, c = 2, σ = 0.2, σ H = 0.3, α = 0.15, τ = 0.35, r = 0.07, and µ = 0.05. 
coupon has a negative effect on the firm value, as long as the riskiness of the assets is given, the firm wants to keep the step-up factor on a level that is as low as possible for a given trigger barrier x T which implies Q = 0. From this equality we can deduce a relation between a minimum x T and δ that satisfies the risk mitigation property, i.e.
Note that the trigger threshold is a multiple of the default threshold x b which itself is a function of c and δ. Figure 1 also shows that the relation between the minimum x T and δ is negative, i.e. for a given combination of x T and δ, a lower x T can only be achieved by increasing δ. This is plausible, since a lower x T means that the risk mitigation property is supposed to apply for a longer time. Thus, the step-up feature δ, that prevents the risk-shift, must be more pronounced. Equation (12) provides the solution to the incentive constraint, and is key to determining the optimal firm value. Let us denote by S the set of pairs (δ, x T ) that lie on the bold section of the graph x T (δ) in figure 1. S is characterized by a minimum and a maximum step-up factor δ. A δ above the minimum step-up factor δ min ensures that the step-up factor is high enough so that the firm has no incentive to increase the risk before the cash flow x hits the barrier x T . A δ below the maximum step-up factor δ max implies that a risk-shift (and accordingly a step-up) in fact takes place before the firm defaults. We can define the set S as follows:
where δ min is the smallest δ such that x T ≤ x 0 :
We will give a precise characterization of δ min and δ max when analyzing whether a step-up bond is worthwhile for a firm or not.
The important property that a step-up bond can add firm value, if and only if the solution (δ * , x * T ) to the maximization problem lies within the set S, reduces the problem to two dimensions: the coupon c and the step-up factor δ. This is due to the fact that the choice of the step-up factor δ uniquely determines the trigger barrier x T (δ). The remaining determination of the solution is conceptually straightforward but algebraically tedious and follows from first-and second-order conditions. Appendix B contains the corresponding details. The optimal step-up design is characterized by the following closed-form representations, which we summarize in Proposition 3 (Optimal design) Given that a step-up bond is optimal to mitigate the asset substitution problem, the optimal design (c * , δ * , x * T ) of a rating-trigger step-up bond is the solution to the optimization program (9) and given by the following closed-form formulae:
Proposition 6 in the next section will give a formal characterization for which firms a step-up bond is optimal. Note, that plugging in c * and δ * in (6) yields the optimal default threshold
The optimal firm value as of time t = 0 simplifies to
The representation for the optimal firm value -given that a step-up provision is optimal -allows for a remarkable interpretation. This is because the representation for the firm value as in (18) also applies to the case of straight debt, the only difference being that the default barrier x * b has a different size. Interestingly, in the case of straight debt the default barrier, given as
is lower than the default barrier in the case of a step-up. Therefore, we can economically interpret the cost from the risk-shifting possibility as a loss of the firm value which is directly revealed by a different default barrier. Moreover, it is well-known that a firm having an infinitely high risk σ H cannot add firm value with a straight bond (see e.g. Leland (1994) ) so that the optimal firm value equals the value (1 − τ )
of an unlevered firm. The formulae for the optimal default barrier x * b,plain together with the representation for the optimal firm value V * 0 confirm this effect, because β tends to zero for an infinitely high risk. In the case that the firm uses a step-up bond and can increase its risk σ H infinitely high, i.e. β H → 0, the optimal default barrier x * b , however, is strictly positive
Thus, the optimal firm value V * 0 with a step-up bond exceeds the firm value with a straight bond even in this extreme situation where the firm can increase its risk arbitrarily high. As a result of the closed-form representations for the optimal design of the stepup provision δ * and x * T , we can derive the following testable implications, which we state as Corollary 4 If a firm optimally uses the step-up provision to counter the riskshifting problem, a more pronounced risk-shifting problem, i.e. a higher σ H , results in a higher step-up factor δ * and a lower trigger barrier x * T . This claim directly follows from the derivatives of (15) and (16) for β H taking into account that β is negative and a strictly increasing function in σ. The intuition for this implication is as follows: If the risk-shifting problem is more pronounced, the firm wants to postpone the risk-shift for a longer time which results in a lower optimal trigger barrier x * T . To ensure that a risk-shift can in fact be prevented, a higher step-up factor is required in order to provide the equity holders with the incentive to keep the risk on the lower level σ. From the optimal triple (c * , δ * , x * T ), it is a priori not clear whether the optimal step-up design can mitigate the agency costs so strongly that it increases the firm value relative to a straight bond. The step-up feature is attractive for the firm if and only if the optimal bond design (c * , δ * , x * T ) results in a feasible relationship between the default barrier x * b , the trigger barrier x * T , and the initial cash flow x 0 , i.e. x * b < x * T < x 0 . This relationship is equivalent to the condition that the step-up factor δ lies in the interval (δ min , δ max ).
In what follows, we determine the conditions for which δ lies within the interval (δ min , δ max ) and thus, a step-up bond adds firm value.
Turning to δ max first, note that from (12), x T (δ) is a multiple of x b (δ), where the multiple depends on δ and β H and can be larger or smaller than one. However, a multiple smaller than one would imply that x T < x b which is not consistent with our definition of a step-up bond. Thus, we can deduce a maximum for δ which satisfies the risk mitigation property and results in an optimal trigger threshold x T ≥ x b , denoted by δ max as
Note that δ max is determined by the intersection of the dashed graph with the solid line in figure 1 and is independent of c.
16 Comparing δ max with the optimal δ * , we can write
Therefore, the upper boundary is never violated in the optimum. Alternatively, the solution for the optimal default barrier (17) indicates that the default barrier cannot exceed the optimal trigger barrier because the term 1 − β H β −1/β H is always below one. This technical property has an important economic interpretation and we highlight this result as Corollary 5 Every firm that optimally uses a step-up bond does not fully exclude a risk-shift but admits a region (x * b ; x * T ) with positive length in which the risk of the firm's assets is high.
Next, turn to δ min . In general, this should be the solution of x T (δ) = x 0 in δ with x T (δ) given as in equation (12). Unfortunately, this equation cannot be evaluated algebraically for an arbitrary coupon c. However, since we are only interested in the optimal triple (c * , δ * , x * T ), we can plug in the optimal coupon c * (δ) given any δ in (12). The corresponding equation has an algebraic solution given by
In general, as long as the the optimal step-up factor is above δ min , the optimal bond design is more favorable than a straight bond. While we could establish that the inequality δ * < δ max for the upper barrier always holds, the inequality δ * > δ min does not need to be valid in general. We can write δ min as
from which we can deduce an equivalent condition for δ min < δ * . This condition simplifies to
Since the inequality involves all relevant parameters, it completely characterizes the conditions under which a step-up provision can mitigate the agency conflict in the sense that it increases firm value. These fundamental findings are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 6 (Optimal Use of Step-Up Bonds for Risk-Shifting) Suppose that a firm has an initial investment risk of σ and a unique, irreversible opportunity to increase the risk to σ H , which is observable but not contractible. An optimally designed step-up bond can add firm value relative to a straight bond, if and only if condition (19) holds.
It is instructive to see for which pairs (σ, σ H ) a step-up feature is worthwhile for the firm, i.e. to determine the conditions on (σ, σ H ) under which it is valueenhancing to solve the agency conflict through issuing a step-up bond. For this purpose, we have to translate condition (19) into a corresponding relation for the risk parameters. Figure 2 indicates when a step-up provision is attractive. The convex functionσ H (σ) refers to the case that condition (19) holds with equality and is drawn as the solid graph. Since β H − β strictly increases with σ H , condition (19) is always satisfied for σ H >σ H (σ). Thus, for all risk levels σ H above the critical levelσ H (σ), a step-up feature is attractive for the firm, while for risk levels σ H <σ H (σ) it is not. Thus, the shaded region contains all pairs (σ, σ H ) for which a step-up bond is able to mitigate the agency problem. The first important outcome from this figure is that for firms with a sufficiently low initial risk σ, a step-up bond is always worthwhile as long as the possibility to (at least slightly) increase the risk σ H − σ > 0 exists. Interestingly, as the initial risk σ is increased, the minimum riskσ H (σ) after a risk-shift for which a step-up bond is still attractive increases more than proportionally. An intuitive explanation for this result is as follows: The value of a firm with straight debt is a convex and declining function in the business risk σ. Thus, a risk-shift primarily hurts firms with a low initial risk σ. For this reason, a step-up feature, that prevents a risk-shift, is especially chosen by low-risk firms. It can even be shown that there exists a limit for σ beyond which step-up bonds are never optimal. To formally prove this, note that β(σ) < 0 is monotonically increasing in σ towards a limit equal to zero. Therefore, the maximum initial β such that condition (19) is satisfied, is given by the critical value β:
which in turn determines the maximum σ. This critical value follows from equation (19) with β H = 0. In line with intuition, once the initial risk σ is very high, it is not worthwhile anymore to implement any step-up feature. This is because the potential to prevent a firm value decline due to a risk-shift is relatively low but the costs in form of a loss of the firm value from the step-up feature are still present. We summarize these findings as
Corollary 7 Firms can increase the firm value with a step-up bond relative to the use of a straight bond in the presence of a risk-shifting possibility in two cases: (i) The initial risk of the firm is sufficiently low.
(ii) The risk-shifting possibility, σ H − σ, is very pronounced and the initial risk σ is below a threshold σ. Conversely, if the initial risk is too high, i.e. σ exceeds σ, then a step-up bond is never worthwhile for the firm independent of the risk-shifting option.
Illustration of Optimal Step-up Features
In this section we illustrate the results with a numerical example. Since the firm value and the step-up features are homogenous of order one in x 0 , we normalize x 0 = 1 without loss of generality. For the parameters, we choose a base case scenario of: µ = 0.05, r = 0.07, α = 0.15 and τ = 0.35 which is broadly consistent with previous literature. 18 Suppose the initial investment risk is σ = 0.2 and the high-risk investment is σ H = 0.3. Table 2 and figure 3 show the numerical results. If the firm issues plain debt
18 See e.g. Goldstein et al. (2001) , Huang and Huang (2002) , Morellec (2004) , Hackbarth et al. (2007) and Bhanot and Mello (2006) . The parameter choices are close to Bhanot and Mello (2006) to enable direct comparison, except for α, i.e. bankruptcy costs. While we choose α = 0.15, which is broadly consistent with empirical evidence according to Andrade and Kaplan (1998) The table reports the optimal firm value and the corresponding bond design for a straight bond with low risk σ = 0.2 and high risk σ H = 0.3. As a further financing possibility a step-up bond is considered where the firm has the possibility to shift its risk from σ to σ H . The other parameter values are: x 0 = 1, α = 0.15, τ = 0.35, r = 0.07, and µ = 0.05. and were able to contract upon the risk choice, the optimal firm value is 42.63 representing the first-best solution. Since the risk policy is not contractible, investors anticipate the incentive of manager-owners to switch to the high risk opportunity immediately after the issue of plain debt. Therefore, in the case of a plain debt issue, the optimal firm value is only 40.75 as a result of a riskshift initiated by the owner-managers. The associated agency costs from the risk-shifting problem can be measured as the difference between the optimal firm value in the first-best case without risk-shifting possibility and the optimal firm value in the case for the high risk σ H . In the example, the agency costs amount to 1.88. With the issuance of an optimal step-up bond, it is possible to reduce these agency costs to 1.57, which is a reduction of roughly 16.5%. The optimal step-up factor turns out to be 1.29, i.e. an increase in the coupon rate of 29% at a trigger level of 0.79. Figure 3 shows the firm value for different financing cases as a function of the high-risk opportunity σ H . In particular, this graph indicates the optimal value of a firm with straight debt without the risk-shifting possibility V plain(σ) , the optimal value of a firm with straight debt V plain(σ H ) with the risk-shifting possibility, and the optimal value of a firm with a step-up bond. This graph indicates the agency costs of the risk-shifting problem as the difference
Bond type
between the optimal firm value without the risk-shifting possibility and in the presence of the risk-shifting possibility. If the risk-shifting problem is present, the optimal firm value is either the value V plain(σ H ) of a firm with straight debt The diagram shows three optimal firm values as a function of a high risk σ H . The first firm value (dotted line) V plain(σ) refers to a firm that uses straight debt and cannot alter its risk. In the second case, the firm can increase its risk to σ H so that V plain(σH ) (dashed line) is the optimal firm value of a firm with straight debt and high risk. The third firm value V step−up (solid line) is the result from an optimal financing with a step-up bond where a risk-shifting possibility from σ to σ H is given. The other parameter values are: and high risk or the optimal firm value V step−up with a step-up bond. As figure 3 reveals, higher values for σ H (at a constant σ = 0.2) imply higher agency costs and can be interpreted as a more pronounced agency conflict. The step-up bond is able to achieve a proportionally higher mitigation of agency costs, when the agency conflict becomes more severe. In this numerical example, a step-up bond is not optimal for σ H belowσ H = 0.239, at which point the solid line (V step−up ) smooth-pastes to the dashed line (V plain(σ H ) ).
Asymmetric Information
In the previous section, we have analyzed the possibility of step-up bonds to mitigate agency conflicts. Now, in this section, we turn to the competing hypothesis for the use of rating-trigger step-up bonds which is the presence of asymmetric information problems. Therefore, we will analyze the possibility for firms to use step-up bonds to convey information about the true business risk to the capital market. Since we know from the previous section that a step-up feature is pri-marily painful for high-risk firms, a step-up feature might be an attractive device for a low-risk firm to credibly distinguish itself from a high-risk firm. Given that a separating equilibrium exists, we want to figure out the optimal design of the step-up feature. This, in turn, will enable us to identify remarkable differences relative to the optimal step-up bond design when agency problems are present. For our analysis we consider two types of firms, each having a cash-flow process following the same dynamics as described in (1), except that type L has diffusion parameter σ, while the type H firm has a diffusion parameter σ H with σ H > σ. Thus type L is a low-risk firm, while H is the high-risk firm. 19 The potential investors know that every firm can be of type L or H, but they have per se no indication about a firm's true type. The owner-managers of the initially non-levered firm, however, know the true type which causes a typical problem of asymmetric information. Since we focus on the ability of step-up bonds to signal the true type, we abstract from further incentive conflicts such as the riskshifting possibility addressed in the previous section. After an issue of a step-up bond, the owner-managers obtain the proceeds from the debt issue in form of a special dividend and they might still hold the equity of a now levered firm. To determine the firm value or even more precisely the wealth obtained by the initial owner-managers, the use of the equity position is crucial. In general, the two alternatives are to hold the shares or to sell them. We can state right from the outset that in the extreme case that the owner-managers sell their shares to outsiders immediately after the debt issuance, a separating equilibrium cannot exist. Apparently, in this case the wealth obtained by the owner-managers equals the equity and the debt value according to the perception of the capital market. Assume that a bond design for good firms existed that could signal a more favorable firm value so that the sum of the values of equity and debt (according to the market perception) increased. Then every other arbitrarily bad firm could also choose this design and the owner-managers would obtain the same wealth as the owner-managers of the good firm. Therefore, every firm could mimic a good firm so that a credible bond design that signals favorable information about the firm does not exist. The formal reason for this finding is the fact that the Spence-Mirrlees condition does not hold, which requires that the marginal costs for sending a signal differ between the two types. 20 This is clearly violated because the owner-managers obtain the same payoff irrespective of the firm's true type.
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However, in the case that some of the shares are kept by the owner-managers, the step-up feature might be able to act as a signalling device. To analyze this important characteristic of step-up bonds, we assume for simplicity that the ownermanagers hold their stocks infinitely long so that the market perception is not relevant for the equity value.
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We will use the following notational convention: C m i,j denotes a claim (firm value or debt value) on the cash-flow of a firm that is actually of type i ∈ (L, H), but which is perceived by outsiders as being of type j ∈ (L, H), while offering a contract (i.e. sending the message) m ∈ {(c, δ, x T ); c ≥ 0, δ ≥ 1, x b < x T ≤ x 0 }. Note that m = (c, 1, x 0 ) describes a plain bond, while we indicate a (yet undetermined optimal) step-up bond by m = (c, δ, x T ).
23 Since the relevant equity value held by the owner-managers is evaluated with the knowledge of the true type, the equity value E m i will carry only one subscript which refers to the true type of the firm. Like for the other claims, the superscript m indicates the bond design. For example, D
denotes the debt value of a high-risk firm being perceived as a low-risk firm that has issued a step-up bond. The firm value from the perspective of the owner-managers is V
. This objective indicates that for a given market perception j, the true type of the firm still matters as the equity value E m i is driven by the true type i rather than the market perception j, while the debt position D m i,j is priced according to the market perception j. Therefore, the costs for a low-risk firm from issuing a step-up bond differ from those of a high-risk firm (and hence, the Spence-Mirrlees condition is fulfilled).
20 For the Spence-Mirrlees conditions, see e.g. Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) . 21 The above reasoning is consistent with results by Nachman and Noe (1994) who find that a (plain) debt contract is optimal to minimize mispricing losses if conditions are such that separating equilibria cannot exist. 22 Manso et al. (2007) consider traded equity. However, they assume that the information asymmetry is dissipated immediately after securities are issued. ("The growth rate becomes public knowledge after the firm raises capital." Manso et al. (2007), p. 20.) 23 Note that a continuum of possible messages exist, since the only restrictions on (c, δ, x T ) are given by c ≥ 0, δ ≥ 1,
To analyze the outcome of a signalling game, we apply the concept of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium which is mainly characterized by the fact that posterior beliefs are determined through Bayes' rule. We denote beliefs about the true type i ∈ (L, H), conditional on the information content from the choice (c, δ, x T ) of the bond contract, as π (i|(c, δ, x T ) ). The signals, i.e. the bond contract characteristics, are chosen such that they maximize the objective function of the informed party. Posterior beliefs about out-of-equilibrium actions are not restricted and can take on any value in [0, 1]. The objective function of the informed party is the expected firm value:
In general, possible equilibria in a signalling game can be classified into separating, pooling, or semi-separating equilibria, and it is well-known that the kind of equilibrium depends on the actual conditional beliefs of the uninformed party. Since it is our focus to analyze whether step-up bonds are a device to credibly signal the firm's true type, we restrict our interest to separating equilibria of the signalling game. Thus, it is natural to consider a situation, where each type of firm chooses a different message in equilibrium. Therefore, we consider the following posterior beliefs:
If the uninformed party receives the message (c, δ, x T ), with δ > 1 and x b < x T < x 0 , i.e. it observes that the firm offers a step-up bond, she beliefs the firm to be of type L. For any other contract design (c
, beliefs are such that the uninformed party considers the firm to be of type H, i.e.
From the proof of proposition 1, we know that a step-up feature is always costly in the sense that it decreases the firm value. Thus, if the H type considers to choose a different step-up design than (c, δ, x T ), only a plain consol bond can ever be optimal, i.e. (c ′ , δ ′ , x ′ T ) = (c, 1, x 0 ), and we can restrict our attention to the situation where only two contracts are offered. A separating equilibrium is then characterized by the fact that by taking into account this posterior beliefs, a firm actually issues a step-up bond only if it is type L, while the type H firm actually prefers straight debt, so that the beliefs are therefore justified. The posterior beliefs, as specified above, are intuitively plausible. The step-up feature is always costly in the sense that it decreases the firm value. For a L type firm, it might be worthwhile to take on this cost in order to be recognized as such, while the H type firm will only have an incentive to mimic the behavior of the L type as long as the benefit of more favorable debt terms will outweigh the costs associated to the step-up provision. As long as this net benefit is positive, the H type firm will mimic the issuing behavior of the L type firm and benefit from the mispricing gain. Only a step-up design such that this net benefit turns negative can be considered as a candidate equilibrium outcome. Therefore we must impose the incentive compatibility condition
for the H type, and likewise
for the L type. Since the issuance of plain debt will be considered as a signal that the firm is of type H, the coupon rate in that case is determined through the parameter σ H , i.e. (c * (σ H ), 1, x 0 ).
In general, the incentive compatibility constraints determine the set of separating equilibria, and this set might contain many of them. From the perspective of the L type firm, it is natural to consider the problem to find some optimal equilibria, where optimality in our setup refers to the maximization of the firm value (or more precisely, the wealth obtained by the former firm-owners). In this sense, we can summarize the optimal step-up bond design problem under asymmetric information as the following optimization program:
The L type firm tries to achieve the highest possible firm value, conditional on the fact that a separating equilibrium can be achieved, where the design of the bond issue perfectly reveals the true type. 24 Therefore, the incentive compatibility inequalities act as constraints to the maximization problem.
25 If a solution (c, δ, x T ) with δ > 1 does not exist, the L type firm issues a plain bond and is perceived as being of type H.
Whenever an equilibrium exists, the incentive condition for the H type firm must be binding. Otherwise, the design of the step-up bond could be (marginally) changed in a neighborhood around (c, δ, x T ) so that the incentive condition of the H type firm is still valid. In particular, a higher step-up barrier x T can be implemented. Since a higher x T increases the firm value V
of the L type firm due to higher tax benefits, the initial step-up bond design (c, δ, x T ) before the increase of x T cannot be optimal.
An analysis of the optimization program brings up two problems: (i) Under which conditions do separating equilibria exist. (ii) Given that these conditions are fulfilled, i.e. a separating equilibrium exists, what is the optimal design of (c, δ, x T ). In general, a separating equilibrium can exist but does not need to exist. In particular, under asymmetric information, we obtain the following result for the use of step-up bonds that contrasts remarkably the equilibrium predictions under the asset substitution hypothesis. We state this in the following proposition. The proof is in appendix C.
Proposition 8 (Optimal Use of
Step-Up Bonds for Asymmetric Information) For any arbitrary risk σ of the low risk firm, any corresponding risk σ H , with σ H ∈ (σ, σ +ǫ) for a positive and sufficiently small ǫ, allows for the determination of a separating equilibrium, i.e. the incentive compatibility conditions in (20) are fulfilled.
This proposition has two important consequences. First, if there is a marginal 24 Note that this formulation of the problem aims not only at establishing a separating equilibrium (or a set of equilibria) but already tries to single out a specific equilibrium of the signalling game. Since the market is aware of the optimizing behavior of the firm, this puts restrictions on their out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Actually, an equilibrium solution of the program (20) would satisfy, or would be the one that survives the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion (see Cho and Kreps (1987) ). This refinement selects a unique pure-strategy equilibrium, that represents the least-cost separating equilibrium. 25 To be precise, we should also note that, as in the previous section, the condition
is a further constraint to the maximization problem, which we left out to ease notation. information asymmetry in the sense that σ H is only infinitesimally higher than σ, a separating equilibrium, in which a step-up bond perfectly reveals the true type, is possible. Second, this proposition also implies that there does not exist an upper boundary on σ beyond which a separating equilibrium is never possible, regardless of σ H . The next section further analyzes the opposing equilibrium predictions for the design and feasibility of step-up bonds under the case of an agency conflict and asymmetric information.
In the remainder of this section, we will deal with the second aspect namely the optimal bond design in a separating equilibrium. Assume that the conditions for a separating equilibrium are fulfilled, i.e. the incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied, then we want to determine which choice of the triple (c, δ, x T ) maximizes the firm value of type L. In principle, one might proceed as follows: Since we know that the incentive compatibility constraint of the H type binds in equilibrium, we can take this as an equality, solve it for c, δ, or x T , and plug in the solution in V
. However, there does not exist an algebraic solution to V
in (c, δ, x T ), since different exponents β, β H are involved additively. Therefore, we cannot supply closed-form solutions in general. However, we are able to derive an important qualitative result about the optimal equilibrium step-up bond design. To state this result in the next proposition, it is helpful to introduce the following simple notational convention. Denote the coupon rate after a step-up has taken place asĉ. Obviously, this is defined asĉ ≡ δ c.
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Proposition 9 The optimal design of a step-up bond under the condition that a separating equilibrium exists, i.e. such that the incentive compatibility constraints in (20) are satisfied, must be such that c → 0, δ → ∞ and 0 < δc =ĉ < ∞.
The proof (which is given in appendix D) relies on an application of the implicit function theorem and shows that for anyĉ the substitution rate dc dx T , that ensures a constant firm value, is smaller for the type L firm than that for the type H firm. To see how this leads to the stated result, consider some arbitrary combination (c,ĉ,
binds with equality. Then for anyĉ an increase in x T must be compensated by a reduction in c to keep the incentive compatibility constraint binding. Because
is smaller for type L than for type H, this change of x T and c increases the firm value for L. Since this property holds for all initial values of c and x T , the optimal choice is such that c → 0 and x T is chosen as high as possible. This result is remarkable, since in comparison to the optimal design of the stepup bond in the presence of the asset substitution problem, it provides an entirely different equilibrium prediction. We will discuss these aspects in more detail in section 5. Table 3 and figure 4 illustrate the optimal step-up design under asymmetric information by numerical optimization results. As in section 3 we consider the base case scenario with µ = 0.05, r = 0.07, α = 0.15, τ = 0.35, and σ = 0.2.
The first row in table 3 corresponds to the first-best solution, i.e. the L type The table reports firm values, the corresponding bond contracts, and the costs of asymmetric information when firms use straight debt (c * (σ), 1, x 0 ) and step-up bonds (c * ,ĉ * , x * T ). The parameter values are: x 0 = 1, σ = 0.2, σ H = 0.3, α = 0.15, τ = 0.35, r = 0.07, and µ = 0.05. 
). However, under asymmetric information this firm value is not achievable, since investors belief that plain debt will be issued by H type firms. Given these beliefs, the second row reports the corresponding results for V
. The costs of asymmetric information (AI) amount to more than 10% of the initial firm value. The third row (V
) reports results for the firm value of the L type where a separating equilibrium is established with a step-up bond. As proven in proposition 9, the optimal initial coupon rate goes to zero, while the step-up factor approaches infinity such that the optimal coupon rate after the step-up (ĉ * ) assumes a finite value. The optimal step-up threshold x * T is chosen as high as possible so that the incentive compatibility constraints still bind. Through this step-up design, the type L firm is able to reduce the AI costs by more than 50%. In the last row of table 3, results for V 
, the H type firm value is higher. This is a result which is not uncommon for the outcome of signalling games.
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Finally, we can see from figure 4 that even for a very small asymmetric information problem in the sense that σ H is only marginally higher than σ, a step-up bond can add firm value in a separating equilibrium. This is in contrast to the results from section 3 regarding the asset substitution hypothesis.
Discussion of Equilibrium Predictions
In contrast to Bhanot and Mello (2006) , but in accordance with Manso et al. (2007) , we find that step-up bonds can be a device to mitigate the asset substitution problem, as well as to signal favorable firm characteristics. In order to distinguish which of the two explanations is consistent with empirical evidence, and to deduce potentially testable hypotheses, it is instructive to compare the corresponding equilibrium predictions. Such a comparison can be made with re-spect to two aspects: (i) The contract design if a step-up bond is optimal, and (ii) the conditions under which a step-up design is optimal.
Consider aspect (i) first. Table 4 summarizes the equilibrium predictions concerning the optimal step-up design, i.e. the optimal choice of the triple (c, δ, x T ). If agency problems are present, the discussion in section 3 has shown that the 
Highest possible x T so that incentive conditions hold step-up bond is optimally designed in a way that the risk-shifting incentives can be mitigated. In particular, from (10) and figure 1 we know that this is optimally accomplished if Q(δ, x T ) = 0 holds. As shown in appendix A, the optimal bond design requires a δ as small as possible for any choice of x T . Likewise, it is optimal to choose a x T as low as possible, for any δ, so that Q = 0 still holds. This is intuitively plausible. Since the step-up threshold determines the time when a risk-shift occurs, the firm wants to set this as low as possible. Thus, the optimal decision about (δ, x T ) balances the benefit from the risk mitigation property to the associated costs of the step-up feature. In contrast, if asymmetric information problems are present, we obtain a completely different optimal step-up design. To achieve a separating equilibrium, the step-up bond design must be sufficiently costly for the high risk firm such that it has no incentive to mimic. The step-up design can be costly in different ways, and proposition 9 has established that the least-cost separating equilibrium from the viewpoint of the low risk firm (type L) is achieved by setting a step-up threshold as high as possible, reducing the initial coupon rate to zero, and implementing a step-up factor that is infinitely high, such that the coupon rate after the step-up assumes some optimal level. The intuition for this contrasting optimal step-up design is the following. In the case of agency problems, the benefit from the step-up bond is to prevent a risk-shift. The time when a risk-shift occurs is intimately linked to the step-up threshold. Therefore, a step-up threshold as low as possible is optimal. In contrast, for signalling reasons, the benefit from the step-up bond is to achieve a separating equilibrium. This can be obtained by imposing costs on the potentially mimicking firm. The same amount of costs can be imposed by very different choices of (c, δ, x T ). In particular, there is no need to have a low level of x T as in the asset substitution case. Actually, as discussed above, it is optimal to have x T as high as possible, while reducing the initial coupon rate to zero. In other words, a reason for the contrasting step-up design is that in the case of agency problems the friction occurs within the firm, while for asymmetric information, the friction occurs between two different firms.
This outcome enables us to draw important conclusions concerning the use of step-up bonds as observed by empirical evidence. The example in the introduction (see table 1) as well as data in Lando and Mortensen (2004) and Houweling et al. (2004) show that the step-up in the coupon rate is on the order of 50 bp, or roughly 10% of the initial coupon rate. Thus, even without carrying out statistical tests, the empirical observations of the design of step-up bonds rather favors the agency conflict hypothesis than the asymmetric information hypothesis.
In what follows, we regard aspect (ii) in order to understand the conditions under which a step-up bond is worthwhile to mitigate risk-shifting versus asymmetric information problems. The crucial parameters, that determine if step-up bonds are optimal are the tax rate τ , the proportional bankruptcy costs α, and the risk parameters σ and σ H . In figure 5 , we indicate parameter constellations for which step-up bonds are feasible as the solid areas in the three-dimensional plot. The three panels in the upper row refer to the case of agency conflicts, while the three panels in the lower row refer to asymmetric information problems.
28 In line with results from section 3, we obtain from the upper row that for all volatility combinations (σ, σ H ) with σ < σ H a step-up bond can add firm value when the initial risk σ is not too high and additionally the risk σ H after the risk-shift is sufficiently high (see proposition 6 and corollary 7). Moreover, we can observe that a lower tax rate τ and higher bankruptcy costs α increase the space in which a step-up bond is attractive for the firm. The equivalent represen- tation in the lower row shows that a separating equilibrium exists (for all other parameter values) whenever the tax rate is sufficiently close to zero. For tax rates above a critical value, no separating equilibrium exists when the volatility σ H of the high-risk firm is very large. However, a separating equilibrium always exists whenever the risk σ H of the high-risk firm only slightly exceeds the risk σ of the low risk firm. Moreover, a comparison of the three diagrams reveals that higher bankruptcy costs strongly increase the space in which a separating equilibrium exists. A striking similarity between the optimal use of step-up bonds in the case of an informational problem and a risk-shifting problem is that step-up bonds are primarily chosen by firms which have high bankruptcy costs α and a low tax rate τ . Thus we can observe that those firms, which exhibit especially unattractive characteristics for the issuance of consol bonds (high bankruptcy costs and low present value of tax shields), use step-up bonds. Moreover, when the firm's risk σ is low, this effect is even fortified because -as illustrated above -a lower σ results in a higher firm value and therefore in a higher firm value increase due to a step-up feature. Furthermore, there are two important differences between the optimal use of step-up bonds under informational and risk-shifting problems: The first difference refers to the level of σ. When the low risk σ is relatively high, step-up bonds are not attractive for firms that suffer from a risk-shifting problem. However, in the case of asymmetric information, a step-up bond can be an optimal financing instrument for low-risk firms with an arbitrarily high risk σ. This is due to the fact that a separating equilibrium exists for any σ whenever the risk σ H of a high-risk firm does not exceed σ too much. Consequently, the observation that a firm with a high risk uses step-up bonds favors the assertion that this firm wants to signal that it does not have an even higher risk σ H , because the opportunity to prevent a risk-shift cannot be worthwhile for it. The second major difference concerns the level of σ H . In the presence of an information problem, a lower σ H for a given σ increases the attractiveness of step-up bonds. This is because if for a combination (σ, σ H ) a separating equilibrium with step-up bonds exist, then it is still optimal for any lower risk σ H with σ < σ H to use a step-up bond. This is not necessarily true for higher σ H . In the case of a risk-shifting problem, we obtain the opposite relationship, i.e. if for a combination (σ, σ H ) a step-up bond is optimally used, then for every higher risk σ H a step-up bond is still optimal. Conversely, for a σ H that only marginally exceeds the low risk level σ a step-up feature is not optimal in the case of a risk-shifting problem. As a consequence, in the case of an asset substitution problem, step-up bonds are only used when the risk-shifting problem is sufficiently severe, i.e. the difference σ H − σ is high, while for signalling reasons, even a modest information problem (i.e. the difference σ H − σ is low) supports the use of a step-up bond.
Conclusion
The observation that firms have recently issued rating-trigger step-up bonds brings up the question: What is the reason for a firm to commit itself to increase the debt service at a time when financial conditions have worsened? This question is even more puzzling in the framework of the well-established tradeoff models for the optimal capital structure. Two frictions, that are notorious in financial economics, might serve as explanations: Agency conflicts and asymmetric information problems. Results from the existing literature have discarded the former, but confirmed the latter hypothesis. Our analysis contributes to this debate in the following points: First, by solving a more general optimization problem, which consists of maximizing firm value with respect to all (three) verifiable parts of the contract and which involves an optimal endogenous risk-shifting policy, we are able to provide closed-form solutions to the optimal step-up design when agency conflicts are present. Furthermore, we derive conditions under which it is optimal to solve the agency conflict by the inclusion of a step-up provision. We find that rating-trigger step-up bonds are indeed able to mitigate the agency conflict. Second, in line with existing results, we find that step-up bonds can establish a separating equilibrium and thus overcome asymmetric information problems. We are able to provide an important result about the optimal design, which then shows that the equilibrium predictions between the two hypotheses differ remarkably: A finite step-up factor, whose order of magnitude is consistent with observed step-up bonds, is optimal for bonds under a risk-shifting problem, while the optimal step-up factor in the case of asymmetric information is found to be infinite. Third, the opposing conditions for the characteristics of firms that issue step-up bonds to mitigate either agency conflicts or problems of asymmetric information directly allow to identify the underlying reason of a firm to use step-up bonds. A firm uses step-up bonds to mitigate the risk-shifting problem when the business risk can be increased con-siderably and/or the initial business risk is sufficiently low. Conversely, firms use step-up bonds to signal favorable information even when the problem of asymmetric information is only modest and irrespective of the initial business risk. An empirical test of these implications is left for further research.
Substituting back (22) into (21) and simplifying gives
With the definitions of K 1 and K 2 , we obtain
Differentiating this term for δ results in
Existence of this solution can be verified by substituting δ * into the numerator of the first fraction in the above derivative.
For the given parameter restrictions, the following relations can be established and verify the uniqueness of this solution
I.e. in δ * , the second derivative is negative, giving the sufficient condition for a maximum. For δ < δ * , the first derivative is positive, while for δ > δ * it is negative, verifying that there is no other optimum.
The optimal solution δ * can be plugged in c * (δ) and c * (δ) can be plugged in
) and x T (δ, c(δ)). It can be shown that this gives the following optimal expressions:
From these considerations, it follows that the optimal values of the firm, the debt and the equity are
C Proof of Proposition 8
We use the following notational convention: c * (σ) will denote the optimal coupon and we define ξ(σ) = x * b /c = (µ−r)β(σ) r(1−β(σ))
. Moreover, we write the incentive compatibility constraints as:
A separating equilibrium requires that IC L > 0 and IC H < 0. We obtain for IC L and IC H the following representations:
IC L and IC H coincide in Λ 1 and Λ 4 and differ through Λ L 2 , Λ H 2 , and Λ 3 (·). Note that the minimum function in Λ L 2 is due to the fact that for a large difference between σ and σ H , c * (σ H )ξ(σ) might be larger than x 0 , which is not possible.
29
Without loss of generality, we can chooseĉ as c * (σ). Therefore we need no similar restrictions in Λ 3 and Λ 4 , since c * (σ)ξ(σ) and c * (σ)ξ(σ H ) take on well-defined limits.
Where appropriate, we indicate that the incentive compatibility constraints are functions of σ, σ H , and x T , i.e. IC = IC(σ, σ H , x T ).
Lemma 10 (Characteristics) (i) For x T = x 0 , IC L (σ, σ, x T ) = IC H (σ, σ, x T ) = 0.
(ii) For
29 In fact, for large σ H and low σ, the equity claim for the type L firm is worthless.
(iv) For all σ H > σ,
For σ H = σ, and for all x T , where the last inequality follows from the fact that β(σ) < β(σ H ) < 0 holds, for all feasible combinations (σ, σ H ) with σ H > σ. From this, it is easily verified that the difference is
The second assertion in part (v) follows trivially from the last inequality, where the difference is zero for σ H = σ.
x T so that the firm value remains unaffected. For type H and L, this approach results in the following representations .
To establish the result, we need to show that |SR L | > |SR H |, or |SR H | |SR L | < 1 for any choice ofĉ holds. Since both SR L and SR H are negative, they indicate that the same firm value can be obtained with a higher trigger threshold x T and an appropriately-chosen lower coupon c. If the relationship |SR L | > |SR H | is satisfied, an increase of x T and a decrease of c so that the firm value of the H type firm remains constant means that the firm value of an L type firm rises. This is due to the fact that for an L type firm a more pronounced decrease of c is required to keep the firm value constant. As a consequence of the fact that the firm value increases with c, the firm value of the L type firm can be increased and the incentive conditions remain satisfied. Therefore, an increase of x T together with an appropriate decrease of c always adds firm value to the L type firm. These changes are feasible until either the coupon c attains zero or the step-up threshold x T hits the current cash-flow level x 0 . Therefore, in any optimal case, we can characterize the step-up bond (c, δ, x T ) as a bond with c = 0 that starts paying a positive coupon at x T . From the definitions of V H,L and V L,L , we find the following derivatives:
With these derivatives,
is independent of c andĉ. By straightforward algebraic manipulations the above inequality can be written as
One can show that the derivative of is always negative. This is due to the fact that the sign of the derivative comes from the term in squared brackets. Since the probability-weighted discount factor D =
x 0 x T β always lies in the interval D ∈ (0, 1) for x T < x 0 , the term (1 − D) + log D is negative such as the derivative of the relevant term. Since β L < β H , inequality (29) is always fulfilled, and the assertion follows.
